Capacity and Procedural Accounts of Impaired Memory in Depression by Hertel, Paula T & Meiser, T.
Trinity University 
Digital Commons @ Trinity 
Psychology Faculty Research Psychology Department 
2000 
Capacity and Procedural Accounts of Impaired Memory in 
Depression 
Paula T. Hertel 
Trinity University, phertel@trinity.edu 
T. Meiser 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/psych_faculty 
 Part of the Psychology Commons 
Publication Details 
Generative Mental Processes and Cognitive Resources: Integrative Research on Adaptation and 
Control 
Repository Citation 
Hertel, P., & Meiser, T. (2000). Capacity and procedural accounts of impaired memory in depression. In U. 
von Hecker, S. Dutke, & G. Sedek (Eds.), Generative mental processes and cognitive resources: Integrative 
research on adaptation and control (pp. 283-307). Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
This Contribution to Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology Department at Digital 
Commons @ Trinity. It has been accepted for inclusion in Psychology Faculty Research by an authorized 
administrator of Digital Commons @ Trinity. For more information, please contact jcostanz@trinity.edu. 
Capacity and Procedural Accounts of Impaired Memory 
in Depression 
Paula Hertel 
Trinity University. San Antonio, USA 
Thorsten Meiser 
University of Bonn, Germany 
Findings of impaired memory in states of dysphoria or depression are 
summarized and subsumed under different accounts of mood-related memory 
deficits. Theoretical accounts based on the assumption of a storage system of 
limited capacity are compared to accounts which emphasize the role of 
procedures and strategies in attending and remembering. Two reanalyses of a 
recent experiment in the process-dissociation paradigm are reported. They 
address issues of dysphoria-related differences in automatic versus controlled 
uses of memory in a task of word-stem completion. The two reanalyses rest 
on different assumptions about the relation between automatic and controlled 
components, but they converge in highlighting the advantages of a procedural 
rather than capacity-based view of memory deficits. finally. similarities to 
other research domains and theoretical approaches are outlined. 
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The empirical link between depressed moods and impaired perfonnance 
on certain memory tasks is well documented - so well, in fact, that the news 
has spread beyond the earshot of traditional memory researchers to such 
places as workshops for memory improvement in elderly populations. A story 
in the June, 1998, issue of the APA Monitor described one clinic workshop's 
"memory building exercises", likening memory to a set of muscles (Sleek, 
1998, p. 32). Presumably, these muscles benefit from deliberate exercise, 
particularly when the older participant is depressed and the muscles become 
even more sluggish. To our knowledge, the muscle metaphor has not been 
formalized. Moreover, the fundamental assumption that nonspecific exercise 
helps is questionable; evidence for effective transfer of training memory 
across different contexts and tasks is scarce. even though those being trained 
often believe that the exercises work (see Bjork, 1994). Although it might be 
possible to build a theoretical framework that takes the muscle metaphor 
seriously and harnesses it for predictive purposes, we describe it merely to 
show that memory metaphors arc commonplace. As Roediger ( 1980) has 
documented, it is difficult to talk about memory without resorting to 
metaphor. In this chapter, we try to underscore the metaphorical nature of the 
two main frameworks for understanding depression-related difficulties in 
remembering - the quite prevalent capacity-based account and the less 
popular procedural account - as we examine their scientific merit. 
First, we offer a synopsis of the empirical findings, crafted without 
appeal to theory. Brief histories of the frameworks are offered in the second 
section. For the purpose of illustrating some advantages of a procedural 
account, the third main section reviews a recently published experiment and 
reports reanalyses of those results. Finally, we briefly describe relationships 
between procedural accounts and other frameworks. 
Synopsis of Findings 
The domain of investigation is memory for emotionally neutral events 
experienced by people whose moods are characterized by some degree of 
depression, dysphoria, or sadness. These negative mood states have been 
operationalized in three main ways. Some studies include samples of 
participants who have been clinically diagnosed with major depression or 
dysthymia (and control groups who are comparable to the depressed groups 
on other indices). Other studies include convenience samples of participants 
who have produced high scores (or low scores in the control groups) on a 
self-report measure like the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI: Beck, Ward, 
Impaired Memory in Depression 285 
Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961 ); these participants are properly called 
"dysphoric" to denote their non-diagnosed, negative affect. Still other 
paradigms include experimental inductions of sad (or neutral) moods in 
nondepressed part1c1pants. Each method has its advantages and 
disadvantages. For example, the advantage of causal inference potentiated by 
experimental inductions is accompanied by the disadvantage of demand 
characteristics associated with many such techniques (see Parrott & Hertel, in 
press). Also. regardless of potential demand, the patterns of findings 
sometimes differ across the methods of operationalizing mood and thereby 
lead us to suspect that the type of "depressed" mood matters (e.g., Hertel & 
Rude, 1991 b ). Our purpose is neither to revisit these issues nor to provide a 
comprehensive review of the literature on depression-related impairments. 
Several good reviews have been published recently. and some of our general 
claims rely on findings they summarize (e.g., Burt, Zembar, & Niederehe, 
1995; Gotlib. Roberts, & Gilboa, 1996; Hartlage. Alloy, Vazquez, & 
Dykman, 1993). Instead, what follows is the shortest possible summary of the 
main findings. As a matter of convenience, we refer to participants in the 
depressed, dysphoric, or sad-mood groups as "depressed". and ask the reader 
to realize that not all studies included depressed samples. 
Direct tests of memory are those in which participants are asked to 
report (recall) a past event or to recognize whether a current event had 
happened previously in some specific context in the past. Tests of free recall 
most typically reveal lower levels of performance by depressed participants, 
compared to their nondepressed counterparts. Published exceptions to the rule 
are found in situations in which the materials to be remembered were well 
structured. such as intact lists of categorized words (e.g .. Weingartner. 
Cohen. Murphy, Martello. & Gerdt, 1981) or prose passages (e.g., Hasher, 
Rose, Zacks, Sanft, & Doren, 1985). Another class of exception includes 
situations in which the task during the period of initial exposure was well 
structured instead of being flexible (e.g .. Hertel & Rude. 1991a). Evidence of 
impaired performance is less consistently obtained when the task is cued 
recall or recognition. Some regularity in the recognition literature can be 
observed when theoretical issues are considered, as we do below. 
Indirect tests of memory are those in which participants are not asked to 
reflect about the past as they perform a task that is designed to reveal effects 
of prior exposure to the test events. As yet, there is no compelling evidence of 
deficient perfom1ance on such tests. as long as the events are emotionally 
neutral (cf., Hertel, l 994b). 
Those are the main findings when one takes the widest and least 
theoretical view. The next section describes the two main metaphors that 
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have been used to account for - indeed, to speak about - these and similar 
findings. 
Metaphors for Understanding Depression-Related Impairments 
Capacity Metaphors 
The roots of capacity accounts of many cognitive phenomena reach at 
least as historically deep as the prose of Freud and James, both of whom 
offered "room" metaphors for mental events (Roediger, 1980). Much later, 
with the advent of  modern cognitive psychology and its flow-chart 
terminology, the rooms became boxes drawn to represent different types of 
memory (e.g., Atkinson & Shiffrin. 1968). These theorists inherited ways of 
talking about mind - indeed, ways of thinking about mind - from Western 
philosophical traditions thoroughly embued with spatial analogies. Mind, 
essentially unobservable, consists of events that take place in space, the space 
being a brain whose structures and functions were not understood sufficiently 
to ofler less metaphorical accounts. 
Working within this framework, many modern memory researchers 
have maintained the Jamesian distinction between the seemingly different 
spaces (or types) of memory: a secondary memory to refer to stored 
representations of past events and knowledge and a primary memory to refer 
to the current contents of consciousness (James, 1890). Because it is obvious 
that we cannot think about very many things simultaneously, primary (or 
working or short-term) memory has been framed as a much smaller space 
than secondary or long-term memory. And so researchers began to discuss 
the limited capacity of short-term memory. as well as the limited capacity of 
attention (the procedure of holding something in consciousness). The 
constructs of short-term and working memory in current models of memory 
are much refined and differentiated, compared to our simplistic description. 
However, it is often not the formal model but instead the loose metaphor that 
provides the theoretical framework for research conducted in the interstices of 
cognition and emotion. 
The earliest major formulation of a capacity account of depression­
related deficits was offered somewhat as a side bar to a more comprehensive 
theoretical proposal. Hasher and Zacks' ( 1979) important contribution was to 
focus on the mental procedures during initial exposure to events to be 
remembered later. These procedures have traditionally been called 
"encoding" to communicate the theoretical assumption that events are 
represented (encoded and stored) in the place called secondary or long-tenn 
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memory. Hasher and lacks proposed that we understand these procedures to 
require more or less attention, along a continuum of controlled to automatic 
processing. Although the proposal regarding degree of attention does not 
require capacity assumptions, the prevalence of spatial metaphors in the 
language of memory researchers no doubt was influential. Stable individual 
differences can easily be conceived as variations in the capacity of working 
memory or in the number of resources available for attending and encoding. 
Individuals have more or less room in which to process information, more or 
fewer resources to devote to a task. In short. after Kahneman ( 1973). the 
authors made the claim that depression reduces or real locates attentional 
capacity. 
Hasher and lacks ( 1979) wrote that the distinction between reduction 
and reallocation was not important in their framework, and in a later capacity 
framework proposed by Ellis and Ashbrook ( 1988) the distinction grew even 
fuzzier. Note the core assumption described by the authors in this excerpt: 
' ... the effect of a disruptive mood state is to reduce the amount of capacity 
available for processing the criterion task" (p. 26). This account rests on the 
assumption that emotional states affect the availability or resources for 
performing the orienting task or the test, so that resource-demanding 
strategies which usually enhance memory perfomiance cannot be carried out. 
As a consequence, memory deficits are expected to be most pronounced in 
tasks which require cognitive effort to a large extent. The authors also 
proposed mediational assumptions that seem somewhat contradictory to the 
notion of capacity reduction: Sad moods might increase the amount of 
irrelevant-task and extra-task processing, thereby reducing the amount of 
spare resources that can be used for the task at hand. What seems unclear is 
whether the authors intended this resource-allocation process to be at all 
flexible and therefore whether there is a testable distinction between 
reduction and reallocation of resources. 
In their later account of cognitive characteristics of aging. I lasher and 
Zacks ( 1988) revisited the capacity issue and summarized the criticisms that 
had emerged during the previous decade. The criticisms focused on 
conceptual and methodological problems related to the lack or clarity and 
specificity in describing the nature of the resources that are reduced or 
reallocated. Claims about capacity reduction in depression. for example, are 
rarely accompanied by independent indications of the amount of capacity 
required by particular tasks and tests and. arguably. many means of doing so 
are flawed. Nevertheless. as Hasher and lacks observed for the domain of 
aging and cognition, we believe that the capacity metaphor was useful in the 
first round of research on depression and cognition. We now summariie the 
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main interpretations offered by those who have conducted research on 
depression and memory with some version of the capacity metaphor in mind. 
First, depression-related impairments are not observed on indirect tests 
of memory, because these tests require few resources. Fragment completion, 
for example, provides a good deal of contextual support for producing the 
target items (see Hasher & Zacks, 1988). Other common claims (e.g., 
Hartlage et al., 1993) are that direct tests require more effort or resources al 
the time of the test and that free recall. in which depression-related deficits 
are mainly observed, is still more effortful than is recognition. Further. direct 
tests commonly show advantages of effortful or resource-dema nding 
strategies performed during initial exposure - strategies such as semantic 
elaboration that establish distinctive memory representations (e.g., Ellis, 
Thomas, & Rodriguez, 1984). The reduction of such advantages in depressed 
states has been interpreted in terms of a corresponding reduction of resources 
or capacity for effortful processing (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). 
Procedural Metaphors 
Every spatial metaphor needs its action components - usually called 
processes, operations, or procedures - to denote that something happens in 
the boxes or rooms. However, not every procedural metaphor requires spatial 
assumptions more specific than brain. In the early 1970's a few memory 
researchers (e.g., Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Tulving & Thomson, 1973) began 
to emphasi:z.e the procedures of mind over its architecture. Perhaps the most 
radical of these theorists, Paul Kolers believed that memory could be 
conceptualized in terms of recapitulated procedures (for a summary, sec 
Kolers & Roediger, 1984). If you have seen something before, for example, 
you will be more likely to remember ("re-member") it if the same or similar 
perceptual procedures arc cued. You can more easily bring a thought to mind 
to the extent that you have done so before in the san1e or a similar conceptual 
context. Therefore, phenomena like memory for previously perceived stimuli, 
transfer of cognitive skills, and dissociations of task perfom1ance arc 
explained in terms of the overlap - or nonoverlap - of cognitive procedures, 
instead of terms referring to storage entities with limited capacity. Of course, 
encoding specificity (Tulving & Thomson, 1973) and transfer-appropriate 
processing (Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977) arc quite similar but I� 
radical frameworks that have enjoyed wider application. In the I 990's the tug 
between an emphasis on process and an emphasis on structure has been 
staged as a debate about the usefulness of metaphorical systems (episodic, 
semantic, declarative, procedural, to name a few), with cognitive 
neuroscience being brought lo bear on both sides; Roediger, Buckner. and 
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McDennott (in press) offer an excellent summary. To systems theorists, 
however, procedural memory is a system for remembering how to do things 
(e.g., tie shoe laces) and stands separate from declarative memory. a 
storehouse of specific episodes and general knowledge. To procedural 
theorists like Kolers, in contrast. all that memory is. is a set of procedures of 
perception and conception. experienced during the initial processing episode 
and re-experienced when presented with sufficiently inviting cues. Others, 
notably Jacoby and Dallas ( 1981 ), Jacoby. Kelley. and Dy wan ( 1989) and 
Whittlesea ( 1993), have argued that the fluency of the procedures when 
reactivated provides one basis for judging whether something has previously 
occurred. If a process is accomplished with case, we surmise that it might 
have happened before (e.g., we might have seen or heard a word earlier). 
especially if a past experience is a plausible source of the current processing 
fluency. 
From a procedural point of view. how should depression-related 
impainnents be conceptualized? One way to answer that question is found 
through Hasher and Zacks' ( 1979) continuum of controlled to automatic 
processing. Without appeal to a capacity metaphor. we can understand that 
procedures of perception and conception require more or less attention. as a 
function of the degree to which they have occurred previously. or the degree 
to which their components have occurred previously (see Moscovitch. 1994; 
Roediger et al., in press). New combinations of components require attention. 
but frequently occurring combinations can be recapitulated automatically 
(Logan & Etherton. 1994 ). Moreover. when people perform apparently 
attention-demanding procedures. greater activity is observed in prefrontal 
regions of the cerebral cortex (e.g .. Posner. 1992). We also know that 
depression correlates inversely with the degree of activity in those regions 
(sec Henriques & Davidson. 199 l ). Without appeal to physiology. however, 
the first author and her colleagues (e.g .. Hertel. 1994a; I lertel & Rude. 1991 a) 
have described depression-related impairments within a framework that 
stresses the focus of attention instead of the capacity it might require. 
First fom1Ulated as the cognitive initiative account of depression-related 
impaim1ents in memory (Hertel & Hardin. 1990). the notion was that 
depressed people have nonnal cognitive abilities (sufficient capacity). but 
they sometimes fail to initiate hcncficial strategies at encoding. retention, or 
retrieval. Depression-related impairments typically have been revealed when 
the initial episode or the test allows flexibility in the focus of attention. In the 
initial-exposure phase of one experiment. for example. materials were 
presented in an 8 s trial format: a semantic decision was either permitted at 
any time during the 8 s or constrained to occur at the end of the trial. when 
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the participant aJso reported the target word. The requirements in the 
constrained condition were intended to focus attention on the task. 'Ille 
flexible condition resulted in a depression-related impairment on the 
subsequent, unexpected test of target recall, but the focused condition did not 
(Hertel & Rude, 1991 a). Clearly, these clinically depressed participants were 
capable of (had sufficient resources or capacity for) attending to the target 
words in ways that benefited their performance on the unexpected test. but 
they did not seem to do so on their own initiative. Similar results were 
obtained when Hertel and Hardin ( 1990) manipulated the focus of attention 
during the test phase in a recognition paradigm. And we have even observed 
deficits on perceptual identification - an indirect test of memory - when the 
initial perception of the words was not required by the orienting task (Hertel, 
1994b). 
One way to think about direct tests of memory, such as recall or 
recognition, is to consider the tests as situations in which we ask participants 
to focus attention on the past and we guide them more or less completely as 
they try to do so. A common intuition is that recognition tests provide more 
of such guidance - in the form of the actual item to be remembered - than do 
tests of free recall. Yet recognition decisions can be made by paying little if 
any attention to the past processing episode. They can be based largely on the 
fluency of perceiving or conceiving the test item, with high fluency giving 
rise to feelings of familiarity (Whittlesea. 1993). When recognition is 
accomplished in this way, we can say that the judgment about the item is 
based on more automatic use of memory and little conscious reflection on the 
prior processing episode (Jacoby, 1991 ). Thus, procedures that occur at the 
time of the test, like procedures at the time of initial exposure, can be 
understood as varying along a continuum of attention. This time, however. it 
is attention to the past (recollection) that is the issue. We would expect 
depression-related impairments to be located in attentional components of 
remembering, not in its automatic basis. The problem lies in how to separate 
the two bases. 
In addressing the nature of procedures operating at test, Jacoby and his 
colleagues (Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993) argued that 
common testing situations are not process pure. Indirect tests of memory 
likely involve at least occasional retrospective glances and, as we described 
above, direct tests invite automatic uses of memory in addition to controlled 
reflection. What was needed was a method for empirically obtaining 
estimates of the two general classes of automatic and controlled components 
of memory. Jacoby's process-dissociation procedure was developed in 
various fom1s to suit different testing paradigms (e.g., recognition or 
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fragment completion). The method always entails two different experimental 
conditions - one that invites automatic and controlled components to work in 
concordance to produce a response and one that requires them to work in 
opposition to each other. Opposition is achieved when automatic components 
encourage a certain response but controlled components select against that 
response. By using these instructional conditions in a recognition paradigm, 
Hertel and Milan (1994) revealed that only the controlled or recollective 
component of recognition was disrupted in a depressed (dysphoric) sample, 
compared to the nondepressed controls. Feelings of familiarity (based on 
automatic uses of memory) were undisturbed in the depressed group. but their 
focus on the past (recollection) was somehow not as good as it could be. 
In testing a procedural account of impairment, the overarching aim is to 
reveal the impairment in one condition and to gain experimental control 
sutlicient to eliminate the impairment in another condition. In a few cases 
(e.g., Ellis. Ottaway. Varner, Becker. & Moore. 1997). researchers have 
offered a very weak manipulation of attentional focus as a test of the account 
and failed to find support. In the same vein, Hertel and Milan manipulated the 
degree of contextual reinstatement at the time of the test. Greater overlap with 
Phase 1 improved estimates of control. but equally so in both depressed and 
nondepressed groups. To explain why the depression-related impairment in 
control was not eliminated, the authors pointed to the flexibility of their 
initial-exposure task. Participants were given 6 s to make a semantic decision 
on each trial. If they did not attend well to the materials during this orienting 
task, their later success in "attending to the past" (or recollecting) would be 
impaired. Clearly. for this procedural account to be useful. however. future 
attempts to gain experimental control over attention must avoid the claim in 
hindsight that better control could have been achieved. But why is such 
strong external control of attention necessary in the first place? 
Instead of describing the attentional difficulty by referring to a capacity 
metaphor, Hertel ( 1997, 1998) turned to some of the procedural assumptions 
implied by research on cognitive aspects of depression (e.g .. fenncll & 
Teasdale. 1984; Ingram, 1984; Klinger, 1982). 1 f depressed participants do 
not focus or sustain attention to the experimental materials on their own 
initiative, perhaps they have reason to focus elsewhere. and their own 
personal concerns arc a likely source. As mentioned ahove. Ellis and 
Ashbrook ( 1988) had also emphasized self com:erns in their resource­
allocation framework. but assumed that a portion of processing capacity is 
allocated to those concerns. In the analysis presented below. we hope to 
illustrate the advantage in using procedural metaphors to understand the 
relationships among attention, self concerns. and memory in depression. 
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A Procedural Analysis of Difficulties in Remembering 
When the task at hand does not require or inspire focused attention, 
depressed people might focus their attention elsewhere. The materials and 
tasks typically used in the laboratory - and probably in many routine 
situations outside the laboratory - are not particularly interesting. Nor are 
they often structured in ways that compel sustained attention. either during 
initial exposure or at the time of the memory test. In short, they allow 
depressed people to ruminate about their own concerns. A recent experiment 
(Hertel, 1998) was designed to address the issue of whether the opportunity 
to ruminate impairs controlled components of remembering in dysphoric 
compared to nondysphoric individuals. The experimental procedure consisted 
of a well-focused study phase (reading word pairs aloud at a 2-second rate), a 
7-minute interval, and a word-fragment completion test. The test, described 
in more detail below, was designed to provide estimates of automatic and 
controlled components of memory, according to the process-dissociation 
procedure (Jacoby, 1 991, 1996). 
In the 7-minute interval between the study phase and the test the 
participants did one of three different things. In the key condition they were 
asked to sit quietly and do nothing. The reasoning was that 7 minutes is long 
enough for depressed participants to experience a substantial ruminative 
episode, and the prediction was that such an episode should impair their focus 
of attention backward during the subsequent memory test. If a depression· 
related deficit in controlled recollection were found in this condition. 
however, we could not confidently attribute it to ruminative tendencies. We 
could not rule out the possibility that depressed participants simply have less 
ability (or available capacity?) for controlled recollection. Therefore. two 
other conditions for passing the 7 minutes were included as possible models 
for what might be happening in the key, unconstrained condition. Dysphoric 
and nondepressed participants in the self-focused condition rated the clarity 
of personal phrases (e.g., my character and who I strive to be; see Nolen· 
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1 993), whereas those in a neutral condition rated the 
clarity of neutral phrases (e.g., the shape of the African continent). If a more 
general impairment were responsible for deficient attentional control, all 
three conditions would be expected to show depression-related deficits. 
Alternatively, if rumination were responsible, it would be prevented in the 
neutral condition and performance should not show a depression-rdated 
impairment in controlled recollection. We now turn to a description of how 
estimates of controlled recollection were obtained, by following the 
procedures of Jacoby ( 1996). 
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Test items consisted of old and new word pairs, with letters in the 
second members of the pairs deleted to produce word fragments.' On half of 
the test trials (inclusion trials), the participants were instructed to use a target 
word (a word from the study phase) that would complete the fragment and be 
semantically related to the context word in front of it; if they could not think 
of such a word from the study phase they should complete the fragment with 
whatever word comes to mind that satisfies the requirements. On the other 
half of the test trials (exclusion trials), participants were told to think of a 
target word that would complete the fragment and fit the context but not to 
use that word and to use another word instead. On inclusion trials, controlled 
and automatic uses of memory are assumed to work in concordance to 
produce a target response. The probability of completing the fragment with a 
target word is assumed to be equal to the probability that the target is 
recollected, plus the probability that it comes to mind automatically in the 
absence of recollection: p(target inclusion) = c + (l - c) a. where c denotes the 
probability of controlled recollection and a denotes the probability of 
automatic retrieval. On exclusion trials, the probability of erroneously 
completing the fragment with a target word is: p(target.:xc1usion) = ( l - c) a. 
Thus, on exclusion trials participants complete the fragment with a target 
word only if they fail to recollect its prior occurrence in the study phase of the 
experiment. By using the above equations, estimates of the parameters c and 
a can be derived from the relative frequencies of target completions on 
inclusion and exclusion trials. 
The analysis of estimates of controlled recollection revealed a reliable 
interaction between the participants' mood and the way they spent the 7-
minute interval between study and test. A reliable dysphoria-related deficit 
was obtained in the unconstrained condition; it was mimicked in the self­
focused condition, but eliminated in the neutral condition. Thus. the self­
focusing task appeared to be a reasonably good model for the ways in which 
deficient control is experienced under unconstrained conditions. The 
experiment therefore provided indirect support for the hypothesis that 
rumination makes it difficult to focus and to sustain attention to the past. 
Because the neutral rating task completely removed the disadvantage of 
1 The full design used by Hertel ( 1998} included a factor for whether the words in each pair 
were semantically related to each other during the study phase; during the test the related 
context word was used to cue the fragment. In general, low levels of perfonnance in tenns of 
both automatic and controlled uses of memory were obtained when unrelated context words 
accompanied target words in the study phase. No reliable interactions with the interval task 
were found. Therefore, in the subsequent reanalyses. results from only the related trials are 
described. 
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dysphoria in controlled recollection. the impairment cannot be understood in 
tenns of a fixed reduction of capacity or resources. Furthermore. this 
conclusion is not qualified by the possibility that negative moods were 
lessened by the potentially distracting task of rating neutral phrases. A mood 
inventory administered immediately after the test revealed slightly more 
negative moods (although not reliably so) in the neutral condition than i n  the 
other two dysphoric groups. 
What was found concerning automatic memory processes? I lertel 
( 1998) had anticipated no reliable depression-related differences in automatic 
uses of memory; depressed mood should exert effects similar to those of 
experimentally divided attention. and the latter manipulation typically affe;:cts 
controlled components of memory while leaving the estimates of automatic 
influences invariant (Jacoby et al.. I 993; sec also Hertel & Milan. I 994). 
With respect to the interval manipulation, a larger automatic component in 
the unconstrained condition, compared to the other two conditions, could be 
understood on the basis of less interf ercnce from reading other words on the 
computer screen during the retention interval. The fluency of processing 
simply might be greater without other similar perceptual events intervening 
between the study pairs and their fragmented counterparts. These hypotheses. 
however. were not examined by Hertel ( 1998), because the dysphoric 
participants' base rates differed across inclusion and exclusion trials and 
thereby rendered an interpretation of estimates of a impossible. In the 
remainder of this chapter, we offer two different routes for understanding the 
procedures used by dysphoric participants. The first, favored by Hertel. is a 
reanalysis based on generate/recognize equations; the second, favored by 
Meiser, is a reanalysis through the use of an extended measurement model 
proposed by Buchner, Erdfelder, and Yaterrodt-Plilnnecke (I 995). The two 
reanalyses rest on different assumptions concerning the relation of automatic 
and controlled processes. However, they converge in the ge neral 
interpretation that a process-oriented view allows a more fine-grained 
understanding of memory deficits in depression than docs a capacity view. 
Reanalysis Via Generate/Recognize Equations 
Perhaps one of the most important contributions emanating from the 
process-dissociation approach is that it has encouraged researchers (both its 
users and its critics) to fonnalize the assumptions being made about memory 
procedures. Jacoby's ( 199 I .  1996) equations for obtaining estimates of the 
two types of components (as described above) capture the assumption that the 
components operate independently: The probability of their joint occurrence 
is equal to the product of the probabilities of their separate occurrences. 
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Clearly. this assumption should not characterize all situations in which 
memory operates. not even all situations that use some version of inclusion 
and exclusion instructions. For example, some versions of those instructions 
might encourage generate/recognize strategies for performing the tasks. In 
this case, possible completions are generated via the automatic use of 
memory for their prior occurrence in the context of the experiment. Then 
controlled processes act as a filter to select the appropriate response from the 
set of generated words in a second step. Because the controlled recollection 
of a completion word as a previously presented target strictly depends on the 
completion word's prior automatic generation. as far as generate/recognize 
strategies are concerned. the independence assumption is necessarily violated. 
Although the use of generate/recognize strategies thereby violate the typical 
assumptions made within the process-dissociation paradigm. nevertheless 
these strategies may be invoked by the use of word-stem completion tests 
with inclusion and exclusion instructions (see Curran & Hintzman. 1995; 
Russo, Cullis, & Parkin, 1998): Participants may be encouraged to generate a 
word to complete the fragment and to use that word on inclusion trials. but to 
reject it on exclusion trials if they recognize it from the study phase. 
Recently. Jacoby ( 1998) has shown that generate/recognize instructions 
resulted in higher base rates during inclusion trials than during exclusion 
trials, presumably due to false recognition of completions generated for new 
fragments. For this reason. when base rates differ in this way. one might 
suspect that generate/recognize instructions or strategies had been used and, 
as a consequence. that the independence assumption had been violated 
(Jacoby. 1998). 
In the recognition experiment by Hertel and Milan ( 1994) base rates did 
not reliably differ; nor did they differ for nondysphoric participants in the 
fragment-completion experiment (Hertel, 1998). The dysphoric participants 
in that experiment, however. responded to new word pairs with target words 
(words that were studied by participants in other counterbalancing 
conditions) less often under exclusion instructions than under inclusion 
instructions. If dysphoric participants produced more conservative base rates 
in exclusion. one might assume that they used the same conservative strategy 
for studied items as well. For this reason. c: might have been overestimated in 
the dysphoric groups and the deficit in c thereby underestimated. Moreover. 
perhaps the base-rate difference in the dysphoric group was an indication that 
these participants used a generate/recognize strategy during the test. Indeed, 
when estimates of a are computed and analyzed. the results resemble what 
some authors have termed a paradoxical dissociation in the unconstrained 
condition. in that the absence of dysphoria is associated with an increase in 
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controlled procedures but a decrease in automatic uses of memory. As Jacoby 
( I  998) discussed, a paradoxical dissociation can result from instructions that 
emphasize the generation of fragment solutions, followed by a check to 
ensure against prior occurrence on exclusion trials (instructions to generate 
and then recognize). Hertel's ( I  998) instructions seemed to be appropriate for 
use of the independence assumption, as was evident in the data from the 
nondysphoric participants. However. the dysphoric participants might have 
responded to those instructions quite differently. On the possibility that 
generate/recognize assumptions might be the better representation of their 
approach to the task, estimates of those two parameters are described next. 
In using a generate/recognize strategy on inclusion trials. participants 
would respond with the target word if it came to mind, whether or not they 
recognized it from the study phase. Therefore, the probability of completing 
the fragment with a target word on inclusion trials serves as an estimate of the 
generation parameter, which is akin to automatic use of memory and 
represents the fluency with which the target word comes to mind. There were 
no reliable differences i n  estimates of generation (inclusion proportions) 
across the three interval conditions for the dysphoric participants (means 
were .60, .52, and .65 i n  the unconstrained, self-focused, and neutral 
conditions, F (2.33) = 2.25).1 
Under generate/recognize assumptions, the probability of completing 
fragments with targets on exclusion trials is equal to the probability that the 
target is generated (the automatic component) and then not recognized: 
p(targefexclusion) = a ( I  - r). Because p(targetinclusion) is an estimate of a. 
estimates of recognition ( r )  can be computed as r = I - p(targelcxc1u�1onl/ 
p(targetinclusion). The dysphoric group's mean recognition estimates were .42, 
.60, and . 73 in the unconstrained, self-focused, and neutral conditions, 
respectively (F (2,33) = 4.04). Only the unconstrained and neutral means 
were reliably different according to Tukey's post-hoc tests (or even when all 
pairwise comparisons were treated as planned comparisons). Again. the 
conclusion is obvious regarding the lack of usefulness of capacity metaphors. 
If dysphoric participants had sufficient resources for the more controlled, 
recognition procedure in the neutral interval condition, those in the 
unconstrained condition must have had them as well. 
2 The level of significance was set at .05 for all statistical tests reported in the chapter; 
individual p-values are not reported. 
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Next. we reconsider the finding of base-rate differences between 
inclusion and exclusion trials and their implications for the estimation of 
controlled and automatic processes within the process-dissociation paradigm. 
An extended measurement model recently developed by Buchner et al. ( 1 995) 
allows for estimates of controlled and automatic processes that are unbiased 
by differential guessing. Therefore, the second reanalysis is based on the 
extended measurement model and provides an alternative account of the 
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Figure I .  Processing-tree representation of the extended process-dissociation model 
according to Buchner, Erdfelder. and Vaterrodt-Plilnnecke ( 1995): c: proba bility of 
controlled recollection of a word from the target phase: a: probability of automatic retrieval 
of a word from the target phase; gi. &:: base rates of target completions in the inclusion and 
exclusion condition. respectively. 
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The extended measurement model is specified as a multinomial 
processing-tree model (cf. Hu & Batchelder, 1994; Riefer & Batchelder. 
1988). The model is displayed in Figure I .  The figure shows separate 
processing trees for fragments corresponding to target words presented in the 
study phase and for fragments corresponding to new words under inclusion 
and exclusion instructions, respectively, as indicated on the left-hand side. On 
the right-hand side, the response to a given fragment is displayed as target or 
new-word completion. The processing trees connecting the status of the 
fragment to the response categories indicate which cognitive states lead to a 
particular response. Thus, on inclusion trials both controlled processes (with 
probability c) and automatic processes (with probability a) result in target 
completions, whereas a new-word completion occurs only in the absence of 
both controlled and automatic processes. On exclusion trials controlled 
processes lead to new-word completions, and in the absence of controlled 
processes automatic uses of memory lead to target completions. Since the 
parameter a for automatic processes is specified to be invariant across the 
mental states of recollection and of non-recollection, that is across branches 
labelled c and 1 -c, the model maintains the assumption of stochastic 
independence of controlled and automatic processes. As mentioned above. 
base-rate parameters for inclusion and exclusion trials, g, and ge. arc 
considered explicitly in the extended measurement model. These parameters 
reflect the baseline use of target words to complete fragments that give rise to 
neither automatic retrieval nor conscious recollection. 
For dysphoric and for nondysphoric participants, the parameters c, a. J!,. 
and ge were estimated for the three interval conditions using the program 
MBT (Hu & Batchelder, 1 996). In the analysis of data from both dysphoric 
and nondysphoric participants, the base-rate parameters were constrained to 
be equal across interval conditions but were free to dif er between inclusion 
and exclusion trials. These specifications resulted in a testable Qlodel that 
) 
showed an excellent fit to the data in terms of the likelihood-ratio statistic Ct. 
which is asymptotically chi-square distributed (G2 = 1 .23, 4 df, for dysphoric 
participants, and G2 = I .86, 4 df, for nondysphoric participants). The base-rate 
parameters of the model differed significantly between inclusion and 
exclusion trials for dysphoric individuals, g, = .30 and g,. = .23 (c2 = 6.97. 
I df), but not for nondysphoric individuals, g, = .26 and g,, = .26 (c2 = 0. 15. 
I df). The unbiased parameter estimates for controlled and automatic 
processes are depicted in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Estimates of controlled and automatic processes in the reanalysis of the word­
fragment completion data via the extended measurement model. 
The results for controlled recollection (Figure 2, upper panel) closely 
resembled the results from the original analysis by Hertel ( 1 998). For the 
group of nondysphoric participants, controlled recollection did not vary 
significantly as a function of interval condition (d = 3.6 1 ,  2 dj). For 
dysphoric individuals, the probability of controlled recollection did not differ 
between the unconstrained and the self-focused condition (G2 = 0.56, I df), 
but was significantly larger in the neutral condition (G2 = 9.49, I df). 
Moreover. an inspection of the confidence intervals of parameter estimates 
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for dysphoric and nondysphoric part1c1pants revealed that controlled 
recollection differed between dysphoric and nondysphoric participants in the 
unconstrained and self-focused conditions, but not in the neutral condition. 
More important for the present purposes are the results of the reanalysis 
concerning automatic components of memory (Figure 2, lower panel). 
Whereas there were no significant differences among interval conditions for 
nondysphoric participants (d = 3.08, 2 dj), estimates for dysphoric 
participants were higher in the unconstrained condition than in the self­
focused and neutral conditions (G2 = 13.51, 1 dfJ, without a significant 
difference between the latter two (G2 = 0.34, I dfJ. Inspection of confidence 
intervals showed that automatic processes differed between dysphoric and 
nondysphoric participants only in the unconstrained condition. 
In summary, the second reanalysis suggests that the combination of 
dysphoric mood and an unfilled interval between the study and the test phase 
was associated with a decrease in the use of controlled processes and an 
increase in automatic uses of memory, compared to the outcomes from 
nondysphoric individuals and those dysphoric individuals who rated neutral 
phra<;es during the 7-minutes interval. This pattern of results can hardly be 
accounted for in tenns of a capacity notion of memory deficits in depression. 
because the deficit in control was absent in the neutral condition. Although 
the relatively high estimate of automatic components for dysphoric 
participants in the unconstrained-interval condition is a unique result and 
therefore must be interpreted with caution, it may be seen as a hint at an 
incomplete processing strategy (cf .. Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1 994) that makes 
less use of the criteria! information that is required to inhibit target responses 
in the exclusion condition (see Gruppuso, Lindsay, & Kelley. 1997). 
Discussion of the Reanalyses 
The two reanalyses rest on different assumptions concerning the 
relation of automatic and controlled processes that guide the word-fragment 
completions. The first analysis drops the assumption of stochastic 
independence and is based on another, by no means less restrictive 
assumption, namely the assumption that controlled recollection processes 
depend on the prior automatic generation of target stimuli. The second 
analysis maintains the original assumption of stochastic independence, 
although its validity cannot be tested in the multinomial model (sec Buchner 
et al., 1995). 
The assumption of stochastic independence is crucial for parameter 
estimation in the process-dissociation paradigm, as already pointed out in 
Jacoby's ( 1 99 1 )  initial article on this procedure. Because stochastic 
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independence - the restriction that the probability of automatic retrieval does 
not vary as a function of controlled recollection and vice versa - cannot be 
explicitly tested, the debate about the validity of the independence 
assumption has been widely concerned with experimental independence - the 
demonstration of an ef ect on one parameter of a manipulation that, at the 
same time. leaves the other parameter unaffected. Although correlations 
between automatic and controlled processes might lead to so-called 
paradoxical or artifactual dissociations between automatic and controlled 
processes as argued by Curran and Hintzman ( 1 995). and although 
generate/recognize instructions can result in  different base rates for the 
inclusion and the exclusion conditions as demonstrated by Jacoby ( l  998), 
neither dissociations nor base-rate differences force the conclusion that 
stochastic independence has been violated. The two reanalyses presented 
herein and the original analysis by Hertel ( 1998) represent different ways to 
take into account base-rate differences in estimating parameters of controlled 
and automatic components of memory. Despite the different assumptions. 
however. the substantive conclusions converged, in that all analyses rendered 
results that support a procedural view of mood-related memory deficits. 
Conclusions and Similarities to Other Perspectives 
The reanalyses we have described yielded results that support the use of 
procedural metaphors of memory impairments in dysphoria and depression. 
rather than explanations expressed in terms of fixed reductions of mental 
resources or capacity. The results are in line with the first author·s emphasis 
on reduced cognitive initiative in depression (Hertel & I lard in. I 990). 
Although the term initiative was intended to refer to the initiation of 
cognitive procedures and strategics that are not compelled directly by the 
task. it often invites motivational interpretations (e.g .. Ellis et al., 1997: 
Hartlage et al.. 1 993). Indeed. the results from Hertel ( I  998). regardless of the 
analysis performed, suggest that motivation is central to an understanding of 
impaired performance, but not in the way one would assume by equating 
initiative and motivation. Instead. the dysphoric participants might have been 
quite motivated to attend to their own personal concerns during the 
unconstrained interval. such that they subsequently showed poorer control of 
attention to the study phase as they took the memory test. 
More generally. a procedural approach to the interaction of motivation 
and cognition in depression is compatible with findings from research in 
domains other than the study of memory. Examples in the field of social 
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cognition include Weary's research on control motivation in depression (see 
Weary, Marsh, Gleicher, & Edwards, 1 993). Depressed individuals seem to 
think harder than do others when social control is at issue; they focus their 
attention appropriately to the source of their concerns. Notice that a capacity 
metaphor cannot easily incorporate these findings. Other examples indude 
studies that have demonstrated the mediating role of motivational factors in 
the effect of mood on social categoriz.ation and stereotyping (e.g., Bless. 
Schwarz, & Wieland, 1996; Forgas & Fiedler, 1 996; Lambert. Khan, Lickel. 
& Fricke, 1 997). I f  mood states reduce available cognitive resources by a 
fixed amount, motivational factors - like the manipulations of task constraint 
in memory experiments - would not be able to change their effects. 
Motivational issues, particularly when raised in the context of cognitive 
strategies, also invite the consideration of the cognitive exhaustion hypothesis 
(Sedek & KoJla, 1 990; Sedek, Kofta. & Tyszka, 1 993). The hypothesis 
claims that the experience of uncontrollable events produces a transitory 
mental state in which constructive information processing is reduced and the 
generation of elaborate solution strategics is diminished. In fact. the 
experimentally induced experience of noncontingency has been shown to 
reduce performance in difficult avoidance problems. to inhibit the generation 
of hypotheses in a discrimination task (Sedek & Kofta, 1 990), and to 
diminish the focus on relevant information in a dillicult decision task (Sedek 
et al., 1993). The hypothesized mental state of cognitive exhaustion is 
considered to be a building block of learned helplessness and might therefore 
also characterize depressive cognition (see von Hecker, Sedek & Mcintosh. 
this volume). A depressed person's focus on sometimes seemingly insoluble 
problems might well impair self-initiated cognitive control in unconstrained 
situations and resemble cognitive exhaustion. 
Our final parallel harkens back to our introductory comments. Perhaps 
it is no coincidence that workshops on depression and memory are offered to 
older people. As others have noted (e.g., Stuss & Benson, 1 984), cognitive 
impairments in elderly samples resemble those experienced by younger 
people with frontal dysfunction, although they arc usually much less SC\WC. 
Noting the parallel between depression and frontal hypoactivation, still others 
might say that being depressed, being old, or having slight frontal 
impairments are indistinguishable in cognitive tasks. With further research. 
such correspondences might well develop and it will be tempting to continue 
talking about them as limitations on capacity. The capacity metaphor. after 
all, is very easy to picture and to understand. Yet, cognitive impaim1cnts 
associated with aging have been described in terms of difliculties with sclf­
initiated procedures (Craik, 1986). controlled processes (Jacoby, Jennings. & 
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Hay. 1 996). and inhibitory processes (Hasher & Zacks. 1988). In this chapter, 
we have illustrated the usefulness of procedural metaphors in accounting for 
experimental phenomena, but they likely have a different advantage as well: 
Unlike capacities, procedures can be trained. Successful training techniques 
with the elderly or the chronically depressed will probably not consist of 
generaJized mnemonic exercises currently used in clinics. as if  memory were 
a set of muscles used for multiple purposes. Instead. the route to successful 
training likely resides in understanding the specificity of the procedures 
involved. 
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